Abstract. This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011) , in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a 'classical collapse' result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP + . Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3 + and FDE + . §1. Introduction. In Beall (2011), I made explicit a 'collapse result' for the (multipleconclusion) propositional logic LP + , and left implicit the corresponding result for the dual (Strong Kleene) logic K3 + . 1 Such logics are philosophically motivated by paradoxical phenomena -cases of apparent 'over-determinacy' (gluts) or 'under-determinacy' (gaps). Such logics are also notoriously weak. But what the collapse results make plain is the sense in which such logics 'collapse' into (the stronger) classical logic in the absence of (let us say) over-/under-determinacy. Such collapse results, I argued in Beall (2011), carry philosophical interest: they illuminate a natural way of responding to the weakness of such logics.
Our interpretations are structures I = D, d , where D = ∅ and d assigns each constant an element of D and assigns each n-ary predicate a (total) function -the so-called intension of the predicate -from D n into V = {1, .5, 0}. Combined with variable assignments ν, we have a denotation function δ defined in the familiar way: δ(t) = ν(t) if t is variable; otherwise, δ(t) = d (t) .
With such structures in hand, we define the notion of semantic value in terms of valuations, which are (total) functions from wff (standardly defined) and variable assignments into V . Leaving reference to the given structures implicit, the semantic value |A| ν of wff A (relative to variable assignment ν) is defined along standard (many-valued) lines, where A and B are any wff:
1. Atomic: |Pt 0 t 1 . . . t n | ν = d(P)( δ(t 0 ), δ(t 1 ), . . . , δ(t n ) ). 2. Negation: |¬ A| ν = 1 − |A| ν . 3. Disjunction: |A ∨ B| ν = max{| A| ν , |B| ν }. 4. Quantifier: |∃x A| ν = max{| A| ν [x] : for each x-variant ν [x] of ν}. 
LP + validity.
The multiple-conclusion generalization of LP is the standard multiple-conclusion idea: namely, expand the relation of validity from ℘ (S) × S to ℘ (S) × ℘ (S).
DEFINITION 2.5. (LP + ). X lp

+
Y iff no LP model satisfies X and dissatisfies Y .
An important observation for present purposes is a notable relation between invalidities in LP and corresponding validities in LP + . Example: while we have the notable invalidity ∃y H y, ∀z(¬H z ∨ Gz) lp + ∃yGy
we also have the corresponding LP + validity:
It is this pattern of inconsistent-conclusion claims (or, in K3, 'complete-premise claims') that our target result captures -a 'collapse' of LP + to classical logic. §3. The classical collapse: LP + . The proof has the structure of the proof in the propositional case (Beall, 2011) ; the key difference is defining the appropriate 'inconsistency set', which is done by stacking existential quantifiers (dually, universal quantifiers for the K3 case). 
Taking the constructed 'twin' to be the theorem's target purely classical model, the proof proceeds by induction on the structure of formulae. and so M does not dissatisfy ι(X ), and so does not dissatisfy Y ∪ ι(X ). §4. The classical collapse: K3 + . In Beall (2011) I noted that K3 + enjoys a dual result but did not give the result explicitly. I pause here to explicitly record the result.
DEFINITION 4.1. (Completeness set). Let the v i be object variables and t i any terms. Then e(X ) is the set of all formulae of the form
Just as ι(X ) is the 'inconsistency set' for X , we have e(X ) the dual: it is the 'completeness set' or 'exhaustive set' (so to speak) for X .
Proof. This follows the proof for LP + exactly, mutatis mutandis. (Anderson & Belnap, 1975; Anderson et al., 1992) , which has both LP and K3 as proper extensions: it is both 'paracomplete' and 'paraconsistent', affording both a new way of dissatisfying sentences and a new way of satisfying sentences. Where e(Y ) and ι(X ) are as above, the result is a straightforward combination:
The proof is left as exercise. §6. Philosophical interest. The foregoing results explicitly record the sense in which LP and, dually, K3 (and, more generally, FDE) 'collapse' to classical logic. One might wonder whether there is any philosophical interest in these results. The answer, as suggested in Beall (2011) , is affirmative, though I only sketch the idea here.
LP and K3 enjoy a good deal of philosophical interest: they are natural candidates for underwriting theories of paradoxical phenomena (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Beall, 2009; Dunn, 1969 Dunn, , 1976 Field, 2008; Horsten, 2011; Kripke, 1975; Priest, 2006; Routley, 1979) . But these logics have an apparently big defect: they are very weak. In LP, for example, material detachment (henceforth, detachment) -similarly, disjunctive syllogism -fails, where A ⊃ B is defined as ¬A ∨ B: 9 A, A ⊃ B lp B And there's nothing (at least nothing obvious) one can add to the premise set to remedy the situation -at least if the resulting language is to remain safe from the sorts of paradox that motivate the weaker logic to begin with. The question has always been: what to do about such weakness?
The foregoing 'collapse results', especially in the multiple-conclusion setting, nicely illustrate a response to the weakness of the given logics. Consider, in particular, the LP + case. While detachment fails, we nonetheless have the following validity, the cousin of detachment:
Notice that the premise set fails to imply any proper subset of the conclusion set. One way of thinking about what's going on is that logic has left us with a 'choice'. When we ask logic what follows from {A, A ⊃ B}, logic tells us that {B, A ∧ ¬A} follows, not that B follows. But how do we choose between B and A ∧ ¬A? Since logic has left us with the choice, we are left to rely on extra-logical principles to make our choice (e.g., principles about rationally rejecting contradictions or etc.).
The case with K3, and more generally, FDE, is precisely the same. The logic itself is weak in various respects; however, by relying on extra-logical principles of acceptance (e.g., that in, say, physics we should accept all instances of excluded middle or etc.) we overcome the weakness of logic in our application of the logic -our acts of inference from choices that logic leaves us (Beall, 2013a; Harman, 1986) .
6.1. Theory expansion. The philosophical application of these ideas can be seen from a different, though closely related, perspective. 10 Think about theory expansion, where theories, in this context, are sets of sentences. Theory expansion is often achieved via closure operators (more below); but this can, in some cases, leave more expanding to do -at no fault to the closure operator. Let me (briefly) explain.
In our efforts to expand our theories, we construct closure operators under which we expand (by closing) our theories. In most cases, logic itself is insufficient as a closure operator, usually because it's silent on the nonlogical vocabulary of the theory. This is why closure-operator construction often utilizes nonlogical rules: rules that are not delivered by logic but are motivated by the theory's phenomena. 11 The LP closure operator, constructed by constraining the LP + operator to singleton conclusions, is this:
As with other subclassical closure operators, the problem with the LP closure operator is its weakness. In many cases, we want B to be in the expansion of our theory {A, A ⊃ B}, but the LP closure of {A, A ⊃ B} doesn't contain B. That's just the failure of detachment.
Expansion via shrieking.
One natural response to the problem is to strengthen the logical closure operator with nonlogical rules. The most natural approach is the 'shrieking approach' (Beall, 2013b,c; Priest, 2006) . The basic idea can be conceived as follows. 12 Logic (let us say, LP) dictates a wide class of models -the class of models deemed 'logically possible' according to logic. Closing our theories under logic (i.e., the logical closure operator defined over the given class of models) takes our theories as far as logic itself goes; but we might have theoretical reasons to close our theories under a strongerthan-logic closure operator. We might, in other words, have theory-specific reasons to 10 I'm grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting this expanded discussion of some of the philosophical ideas around the collapse results. 11 Terminology is nonuniform (at best) around this topic. Some researchers talk of the 'logic of such-n-so' (e.g., logic of knowledge, logic of necessity, etc.), where the such-n-so is a notion or operator that is beyond bare logic on traditional criteria (e.g., 'topic neutrality', or etc.). In my view, what researchers are doing when they're doing so-called logic of knowledge (to take one example) is coming up with nonlogical rules that are thought to be essential to the right closure operator for the theory of knowledge. Logic doesn't tell you that knowledge 'delivers' truth; however, the appropriate closure operator for the theory of knowledge (say, K ) should deliver as much via a standard (nonlogical) rule: K (A) delivers A, where the delivers relation is simply delivers according to the closure operator. 12 NB: my aim here is not to give a full discussion (or details) of how the shrieking method works; I give it only as an example that helps to illustrate some of the philosophical issues addressed by the 'collapse results' discussed in this discussion.
invoke a closure operator that properly extends the purely logical closure operator (i.e., if the logical operator puts A in the closed theory, so does the stronger closure operator, but the latter puts more into the theory than the purely logical operator does). And this, at least on one (model-theoretic) way of thinking, drives the basic 'shrieking method'. Letting A! (pronounced 'A shriek') be A∧¬A, we construct nonlogical 'shriek rules' for given predicates in the language of the theory. 13 For simplicity, consider a unary predicate P in the language. Letting T be the theory's closure operator, predicate P's shriek rule is a nonlogical rule -part of the constructed closure operator -of the form: 14 ∃x (Px!) T ⊥ Such rules, conceived model-theoretically, have the effect of restricting the class of LP models. Indeed, given the classical collapse result for LP + , as in §3, it is not difficult to see that such shriek rules, if applied to all predicates of the theory's language, result in an in-effect classical theory: 15 the resulting theory is (negation-) inconsistent on pain of triviality. For just this reason, if we have 'shrieked' (given shriek rules for) all predicates in A, then we get the effect of detachment via our theory's (stronger-than-logic) closure operator; {A, A ⊃ B}, according to the bolstered closure operator, 'delivers' B for all A and B, since (we're assuming) we have shrieked A itself (and all predicates in it):
The models recognized by T are (for lack of better terminology) T -admissible models. Any T -admissible model in which A! is true is the trivial model; and any T -admissible model in which {A, A ⊃ B} is true is one in which B is true. This isn't the validity of detachment; but it is a sort of 'detachment' -theory-specific detachment, tied specifically to a theory's closure operator.
When shrieking ends: extra-logical choices.
But now a question emerges: if the 'shrieking method' suffices for getting suitable closure operators for our theories, ones that deliver the effect of detachment, then why do we need to talk about 'choices that logic leaves us' and 'extra-logical principles of acceptance/rejection' and the like? More crudely: why not just say that detachment (or disjunctive syllogism, etc.) is logically invalid but that it is 'good by the lights of our bolstered closure operator'? If, in response to the weakness of our logic (e.g., failure of detachment or of disjunctive syllogism, etc.) we construct a stronger-than-logic closure operator that delivers all of the effects of having detachment, then we haven't really lost detachment or disjunctive syllogism or the like at all -and so the issue seems to be little more than terminological. But it's not so simple.
In our efforts to expand our theories, we invoke logic's closure operator. The result of such closure delivers fewer claims than we think our theory should contain. In turn, 13 Priest (2006) advanced (what I call) the shrieking idea early on, though his formulation suffers from using a logical-strength conditional (and his formulation is more coarse-grained than the predicate-tied approach I've advanced elsewhere). See Beall (2013b) for discussion, and Beall (2013c) for the basic method. 14 In what follows, ⊥ is some sentence that, according to either logic or the bolstered (theoryspecific) closure operator, implies all sentences. 15 By classical theory, in this context, I mean a theory closed under classical logic or under any closure operator that, via nonlogical rules, strengthens -but assumes as basic -the classical closure operator.
we bolster logic with nonlogical rules in our effort to construct a more appropriate, stronger closure operator. In the case under discussion, namely, LP-based theories, we construct stronger operators via nonlogical shriek rules (among other nonlogical rules). 16 But, of course, we cannot forget the phenomena that drove us 'below' classical logic to begin with, such as the paradoxes (e.g., truth-theoretic paradoxes, or the like)! Accordingly, we cannot shriek all predicates of the language: we can't shriek the ones that deliver gluts! Where does this leave us? The answer points back to the importance of extra-logical principles of acceptance/rejection etc. Consider, in particular, the predicates that we do not shriek. Let G be such a predicate. Since we do not have shriek rules for G (or anything with their effect), we have nothing in the closure operator of our theory beyond what basic logic delivers. And now we are back to the need for extra-logical principles in the face of 'choices' that logic gives us. In short, we want to expand our (say, super theory of) theory {Gb, Gb ⊃ Pb}, where P can be shrieked or not, and b is some name. We have no special nonlogical rules governing G, and so our theory's overall closure operator simply looks to logic for what follows. Logic doesn't sanction detachment, and so we don't get Pb from logic. What logic does sanction is the cousin of detachment:
But our aim is to expand our theory. Logic gives us the choice between Pb and Gb!, but it fails to zero in on exactly one of them. The rational route towards expansion is the familiar one: we now rely on extra-logical principles of acceptance and/or rejection. In the current case, we rely on a longstanding rejection principle:
IR. Reject contradictions (i.e., sentences of the form A ∧ ¬A)!
Relying on this principle, we reject Gb! and expand our theory with Pb. This is something we do; our closure operator is not up to the task. Bolstering closure operators via (nonlogical) shriek rules goes a long way towards living without detachment, disjunctive syllogism, or the like; but not every predicate can be shrieked -the paradoxical phenomena that motivated going subclassical can't be shrieked. When the shrieking stops, we are left with the choices that logic leaves us; and that's where, I have suggested, extra-logical principles come into play.
There is much more to be said on this topic, but the general philosophical interest in the given 'collapse results' is (I hope) clear. What these results suggest is that, when nonlogical (say, shriek) rules are inappropriate, the weakness of the logics (or closure operators built on top of them) is overcome via other resources: we rely on extra-logical resources to reject all elements of ι(X ) or, dually, accept all elements of e(X ), and in so doing 'return' to patterns of classical inference. 17 §7. Acknowledgments. In addition to very useful comments from anonymous referees, I am very grateful to a number of people whose feedback on the ideas in Beall (2011) directly motivated this note: Michael Glanzberg, Volker Halbach, Ole Hjortland, Leon Horsten, Hannes Leitgeb, Toby Meadows, Julien Murzi, Stephen Read, and Stewart Shapiro. Additionally, I'm grateful for support from the MCMP in Munich, and for a very productive MCMP conference on truth theories that greatly benefited my work. I'm also grateful for ongoing discussion with other travelers in the ideas of this project: Aaron Cotnoir, Hartry Field, Michael Hughes, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Lionel Shapiro, and Ross Vandegrift -and, out of alphabetical order but perhaps above all, very much David Ripley. Additionally, I want to express special thanks to Henry Towsner, who quickly confirmed the proof idea in an e-mail by in fact formulating his own version, and also to Joshua Schechter who, as noted in a footnote, spotted an error in an earlier formulation of Lemma 3.9 (and, hence, in corresponding proofs of theorems) -and also offered very useful feedback. Finally, I'm grateful to participants in a NELLC meeting at Yale University in April 2012 during which some of these ideas were discussed, including Susanne Bobzien, Phil Bricker, Agustin Ráyo, Marcus Rossberg, Zoltán Szabó, Bruno Whittle, and especially Vann McGee, whose subsequent correspondence on the topic(s) continues to be valuable.
A. Appendix: a sequent system for LP + . An adequate two-sided sequent system for (first-order) LP + may be achieved via the flip-tableau method followed in Beall (2011, Appendix) . In this appendix I simply set out the system (with a note on adding identity), rehearsing a lot of presentation from Beall (2011) , and relying on the adequate first-order LP tableau system (and proofs) available in Priest (2008) . 18 I note here, again, that Avron (1991) was the first to record the propositional fragment of this system (and many related systems).
A.1. Notation. Throughout, A and B are any sentences unless otherwise noted; , , and are any sets (not multisets) of sentences; and, following convention, the comma is union and ' , A' abbreviates ' ∪ {A}'. I use the turnstile for sequents. In the quantifier rules, v is any variable; c is any (closed) Proof. The given completeness proof is Cut-free, which, together with soundness, affords a straightforward induction on proof length.
A.7. Adding identity to LP. Adding identity to LP (similarly K3, FDE) is relatively straightforward, at least model-theoretically. For LP 'semantics', we ensure that all 'identity pairs' o, o are in the extension of the identity predicate; however, unlike classical logic (and K3), identity claims can be false too: ¬(t = t) can be true (e.g., if in a model the intension of the identity predicate maps δ(t), δ(t) to the nonclassical value).
But adding identity in a sequent setting raises issues highlighted by Negri & von Plato, issues brought to my attention by David Ripley (correspondence) and anonymous referees. 22 In general, as Negri & von Plato illustrate, adding axioms for (say) identity in a sequent setting ruins either the no-exceptions cut-elimination property (all cuts, including those on identity claims, can be eliminated) or the no-exceptions subformula property (holds for all sequents, including identity-involving ones).
In our LP + case, we lose the general (i.e., no-exceptions) subformula property (one has the subformula property except for identity claims); but we keep general (no-exceptions) cut-elimination. The most straightforward 'translation' of our target tableau identity rules delivers sequent rules that preserve cut-elimination, and indeed take a form in the family of Negri & von Plato's (2008) strategies for preserving general cut-elimination.
Following our 'flipped-tableau translation' strategy, we augment the sequent system with identity by adding two (left) rules and a 'drop' rule: 23 21 The only fiddle one needs to do is translate my talk of models (dis-) satisfying formulae and sets of formulae into Priest's use of so-called 'relational models'. The 'translation manual' in Beall (2011, Appendix) will serve to give the basic idea. 22 I have benefited greatly from correspondence with David Ripley on this issue. 23 The two left rules are straightforward 'translations' of the corresponding tableau rules:
The 'drop' rule, in turn, 'translates' the tableau rule which, in effect, says that one gets any free identity claim (positively marked) from nothing on any branch of the tableau, namely:
This rule 'translates' into a sequent rule that breaks the general subformula property: it drops an identity claim into nothing -the claim disappears (so to speak). The terminology of 'drop rule' is from Ripley (2013a,b) . The adequacy results in Priest (2008) cover the resulting system, which, as above, does not have the no-exception subformula property but does enjoy general (i.e., no-exceptions) cut elimination.
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